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Abstract
Moderate and measured takes on cyber security threats are swamped by the recent flood of research and policy positions
in the cyber research field offering hyperbolic perspectives based on limited observations. This skewed perspective sug-
gests constant cyber disasters that are confronting humanity constantly. The general tone of the debate argues that cyber
war is already upon us and our future will only witness more cyber doom. However, these hyperbolic perspectives are
being countered by empirical investigations that produce the opposite of what is to be expected. It is generally observed
that limited cyber engagements throughout the geopolitical system are the dominant form of interaction. Our task here
is to offer a different path forward. We first posit what can be known about cyber security interactions with data as well
as what cannot. Where is the water’s edge in cyber security research? We then examine the known works in the field
that utilize data and evidence to examine cyber security processes. Finally, we conclude with an offering of what types of
studies need to be done in the future to move the field forward, away from the prognostication and generalizations so
typical in the discourse in this constantly changing and growing field.
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1. The Challenge of Cyber Security Threat Data
Beginning in 2014, various news organizations began re-
porting on a particular cyber security firm, Norse Corpo-
ration, and their active cyber threat map (Walker, 2015).
Mashable noted in 2016 that “the global cyber war is rag-
ing on, and this mesmerizing map shows just how seri-
ous it has become” (Gallucci, 2016). The map is dynamic,
colorful, and gets the point across quickly, a criterion for
any decent visualization of data. As late of August 2017,
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) tweeted out a link
and photo of the threat maps suggesting it represented
ongoing cyber-attacks (DIA, 2017). Yet this map is not a
very clear representation of any real threats that nation-
states face on a daily basis.
Unfortunately, the Norse cyber threat map does not
represent active threat data, but attacks, likely by bots,
on preset honeypots. Honeypots are a method of provid-
ing data on fake targets to either distract the opposition
from the real targets or to deter an aggressor from at-
tacking in the first place (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). While
sometimes a useful method to gather threat intelligence
if presented a sleight of hand for an attractive target, hon-
eypots as reported in popular discourse are not exactly
an accurate representation of the cyber threat landscape.
In this case, the goal was to demonstrate the ability to
track global attacks to gain interest in the company and
promote its capabilities.
Nearly all active threat maps either present data
tracking honeypots and various bot networks that are de-
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void of human agency, simply presenting what is in fact
fake data. Active representation of the threat landscape
is the goal, but the reality is that the picture of the cy-
ber security threat landscape we currently have is incom-
plete, misleading, or outright fake.
High profile data breaches have been consuming me-
dia narratives for at least a decade. With each act of cy-
ber disruption or espionage, pundits as well as govern-
ment officials and several academics declare that cyber-
warfare is upon us, is the future of warfare, and it is only
a matter of time before a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” wreaks
havoc on the American homeland (Gurdus, 2016). With
this new revolution in military affairs, the battlefield, ac-
cording to some, is forever changed and the next big war
could very well be a cyberwar (Clarke & Knake, 2010;
Kello, 2013). Politicians, pundits, and practitioners have
jumped on this doomsday narrative and have promoted
cyber arms races, offensive advantage, and deterrence
strategies to stay one step ahead of would be adversaries
in order to prevent them from infiltrating networks out
of fear of massive retaliation. These revolutionists point
to acts such as Stuxnet, Shamoon, Sony, and the Office of
Personal Management (OPM) hack as the new norm of
conflict between states, and that the US is losing ground
with every tolerated cyber-attack on American networks.
This illustration points out the need for reliable col-
lected data on cyber incidents between entities to chal-
lenge threat inflation. Empirical evidence and inferences
with data from the academic community can help serve
policy makers in constructing policies that help in devel-
oping proper normative behavior from states.
The challenge of collecting cyber security data runs
right up against the difficult reality of collecting infor-
mation on active threat interactions in real time. The
process is difficult, complicated, and prone to error, but
not impossible. Researchers need to be clear that there
is an imperative to collect data on all forms of con-
flict and no domain presents easy opportunities for data
collection. Scholars and activists alike are still trying to
sort through casualty data in Syria (Black, 2016). Human
Rights Watch (2017) data is likely prone to reporting bias
reflected by an increased interest in human rights abuses
through time.
The impediment for cyber security can be considered
even more challenging. While interest in cyber security
interactions is increasing, bringing with it elevated re-
porting of cyber breaches, there remains a greater prob-
lem. In a domain thought to be mostly secret, how do
you collect data onwhatmost of the population assumes
is uncollectable and mainly classified? Why even seek to
overcome this challenge, given the high degree of diffi-
culty? In this article, we will review why the need to col-
lect data on cyber security interactions, how the process
can be conducted and is not only possible but happen-
ing, highlight ongoing attempts to empirically assess the
cyber security complex.
2. The Need for Cyber Security Data
Moderate and measured takes on cyber security issues
that intersect with policy and international relations is-
sues can be out of place amongst the recent flood of re-
search and policy positions in the cyber conflict and se-
curity field. The general tone of the debate suggests that
cyber war is here, it is our present, and it will be our fu-
ture. One gets millions of hits if “Cyber Pearl Harbor” is
Googled (Lawson &Middleton, 2016). The basic assump-
tion is that our future military, diplomatic, and economic
history will involve the use of computers as the main av-
enue of attack and defense because these technologies
are not only transformative, but also cheap and easy.
Cyber strategies and tactics are like any other tech-
nological development. At first, new technologies sug-
gest immense possibilities and promise to give states an
edge, yet the reality is that technological advances rarely
change the face of the battlefield, either in the diplo-
matic, economic, ormilitary realm.New technologies can
be used to defeat specific threats or defenses, such as the
tank helping break the stalemate of the trenches inWorld
War I; but are often limited in other contexts. Tanks need
to be supported by infantry and logistical teams con-
stantly supplying fuel or towing the machines, limiting
their effectiveness and reach. cyber strategies will be no
different, and they will be just another important piece
in the arsenal but not game-changing on their own.
Claims of revolutionary importance are easy tomake,
and persuasive given certain examples, but there are al-
ways countering examples. Vasquez (1991) makes the
case that nuclear weapons were not responsible for the
long peace during the Cold War, rather the lack of direct
territorial disputes between rivals limited devastating
war. The important point is that no one example or story
tells the complete picture, and for thatwe need evidence
and data to support much of the theory and practice.
Data-focused research can make an important and
lasting statement. By looking at the complete landscape
of interactions, we can leverage a different view of the
evidence and data. No longer does one attack stand out,
but the total picture emerges and in cyber security it is
a picture of a restrained international system developing
a norm against the use of cyber weaponry (Valeriano &
Maness, 2015).
We do offer one key caveat. Our focus is mainly on
nation-state interactions because they are discussed as
the most devastating and dangerous. In reality, collect-
ing data on cyber-crime or digital attacks of civil society
is just as important, but ignored in the field. We hope
refocus the debate a bit here and help scholars rethink
the domain regarding the nation-state seeking to move
towards a more holistic view of cyber security as an ev-
eryday security issue. By moving beyond the dramatic
examples of Stuxnet and the Sony Hack, we can expand
the range of possibilities but also expose the limitations
inherent in new technologies. These caveats are critical
when theorizing about the future use of cyber weaponry.
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3. Reality Is a Social Construction
There have been many challenges to the utility of data
in international relations. Hedley Bull (1966) long ago ar-
gued that data-based analysis was tortuous and inele-
gant. He also maintained that nothing in data-based ex-
amination goes beyond what can be deduced using con-
ventional wisdom. J. David Singer (1969) challenged this
presentation as being naïve about the utility and purpose
of data. There is a limitation on our ability to understand
the world without taking a total snapshot of interactions
to make predictions, understand patterns, and examine
how outliers may alter our perceptions of interactions.
Data can illuminate counterintuitive patterns not readily
apparent to the qualitative observer.
Insights frompostmodern and critical scholars are im-
perative to our task. If reality is basically what we make
of it (Berger & Luckmann, 1991), what happenswhen the
perspective we construct to deal with nascent threats
is divorced from reality? While data and evidence will
never be value free, an insight offered by critical theory,
it also offers a more nuanced approach to the issue than
selecting the obvious cases for examination and extrapo-
lating from outliers. Wemust start somewhere; the post-
modern project is a reaction to the behavioral turn in
the social sciences. The cyber security field has to yet
to even start its behavioral moment but seems to have
started with the suggestion that collecting data is impos-
sible (Kello, 2013).
As Vasquez (1998, p. 218) points out, language
and conceptual frameworks are prone to self-fulfilling
prophecies. If we allow the language we use to construct
how we view security challenges, we likely will miss key
developments in the field. Social science is not value-
free, but this does not mean that it must be data-free in
order to reflect the true state of nature. Language with-
out the consideration of data and evidence will often be
empty and akin to Norse’s threat map, which is an imper-
fect and often a misrepresented vision of reality.
Using social science methods can improve the prac-
tice of cyber security. “Science is not simply a useful tool,
but a practice that creates amode of life that consciously
destroys other ways of thinking and living” (Vasquez,
1998, p. 219). Without encouraging the perspective that
data adds to the cyber security debate, we might ac-
cept observations as truth when in fact they merely re-
flect a skewed sample that is not reflective of actual pat-
terns and practice. To encourage better behavior in cy-
berspace, to stop gross abuses, and to predict future
events, we must move beyond biased and constrained
samples offered by observational logic that cannot move
beyond description and theoretical logic.
For Vasquez (1998), “good” empirical theories should
be accurate, falsifiable, have explanatory power, be pro-
gressive, be consistent with what is known in other ar-
eas, yet also be parsimonious. Theories must pass rea-
sonable tests of fact first. The process of progress inher-
ent in a social science enterprise starts with the collec-
tion and analysis of data. Once data is collected, positions
and theories can be challenged and falsified in light of ev-
idence. We then can move towards explaining the past,
present and future based on the data processes that we
observe now.
The key addition of Lakatos (1970) is that for a the-
ory to be progressive, it must obtain more empirical con-
tent than the prior theory and generate new and interest-
ing questions. Without a foundation of theory, data and
logic, we have no bias on which to proceed with knowl-
edge based inquiries. Cyber security theory is empty
without a firm foundation of fact that then pushes us to
explore new directions.
Of course, data is always biased by the unit collecting
the data and interpreting the evidence. However, this is
also a strength of data, others can come along and use
it for their own ends and expand upon the original in-
tent of the data to build different perspectives. The basic
point is that we need to stop engaging important policy
questions through prognostication that would be more
suitable on a 2am television advertisement. Political sci-
entists and policymakers should not be fortune tellers
who make guesses about the future without reference
to what we already know.We have evidence from the re-
cent past and emerging contemporary situation, so we
must use it to engage critical policy questions.
4. What We Can and Cannot Know from Data
It is thought that most cyber strategies and events are
secret, but this is not entirely true. Much of what hap-
pens in cyberspace is the definition of overt―by interact-
ingwith external networks, threat actorsmake their pres-
ence known. Attackers may try to mask their origins, but
language traits, common techniques and malware, and
motive as well as historical context can give us a great
deal of information about who is attacking whom. For
example, near the beginning of the 2018Winter Olympic
Games in Pyeong Chang, South Korea, the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) was hacked and subsequently
stolen emails from the organization were released to the
public (Matsakis, 2018). Forensic analysis attributes this
operation to the Russian Federation, which was the pri-
mary culprit from the beginning, as the country had been
banned from competition for the games for a massive
doping scandal that Moscow vehemently denies guilt
to this day. Feeling cheated, the APT 28 Russian hack-
ing group FancyBear, the same group responsible for at-
tacking Democratic Party networks during the 2016 US
presidential election, enacted their revenge in the digi-
tal realm.
Covert action is “the effort of one government to in-
fluence politics, opinions, and events in another state
through means that are not attributable to the sponsor-
ing state” (Anderson, 1998, p. 423). Yet in cyber security,
the attribution problem is often overstated, what is be-
yond our ability is constructing real-time data that can be
used to charge culprits in the act based on domestic le-
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gal standards. Observing malicious cyber behavior is pos-
sible but delineating responsibly in a legal sense is quite
difficult. Measuring ongoing infiltrations, unknown zero-
day threats, and attempts at access that fail are difficult
if not impossible to observe. Once an operation achieves
a certain level of access, inserts malware into the target,
and seeks to coerce the opposition, there are clear ob-
servable patterns that can be documented.
In short, there is much we can know about the cyber
security domain that can be gleamed from observations.
Operating in this landscape as if the threats cannot be
known, monitored, and predicted betrays the great ad-
vances we have made in doing exactly this. What we can-
not do is watch ongoing operations as they occur. This is
mainly because organizationsmight not know they are vi-
olated till after this happens, aswas the case for theOPM
hack (Koerner, 2016). Cyber security companies might
operate at a level where they promise a great deal of in-
formation, but this is likely to be a promise that cannot
be kept. There is clearly a great utility in cyber security
data, but we must temper expectations and excitement
with collaborative analysis and sobered expectations of
the utility of these data-based efforts.
In the cyber security field, we witness all sorts of in-
teractions that can be processed into data. Incidents and
events, malware and its spread, vulnerabilities, and so-
cial media interactions are all critical elements of the
cyber security discourse and represent collectable data
samples. Yet, the majority of the cyber security field
seems to reject the idea that data collection is possible.
This is perplexing in the face of calls to reform the vulner-
abilities equities process (VEP), or the process by which
threats are communicated by the government to private
industry (Newman, 2017). Cyber security data is clearly
observable and a part of the news cycle for cyber interac-
tions, but it is generally removed from the political, pol-
icy, and military discourse.
Unfortunately, some critics and skeptics believe that
collecting data on a subject is synonymous with perfect
information about a topic. Data producers have never
claimed that their data was complete, total, or absent
of bias. These attributes are common for all data en-
terprises. In the social science world, all data collection
enterprises will be incomplete or inaccurate in some
way. This does not mean that data projects should be
scrapped, but that those who use these projects should
understand the limits and possibilities inherent in data
collection enterprises.
It must also be made clear that are we are gener-
ally speaking of cyber security interactions are they per-
tain to state-based action. Extending this data-based ar-
chitecture to criminal interactions would require differ-
ent theories, data collection methods, and processes.
Future efforts should seek to move beyond the state
towards examining non-state behavior including crimi-
nal interactions.
We can only observe what actually happens rather
than what was intended to happen, this is one reason to
focus on states where malicious action is to be expected
and even admitted at times. It is not exactly an inter-
state crisis if one state tries to attack another state in cy-
berspace and fails to be noticed. This is an unobserved
process, a tree falling in the woods with no one to wit-
ness the fall so to speak. Can there really be a coercive
impact if one node in the interaction does not even know
there was an interaction?
Scholars must be prepared to go to war with the
data we have, not the data we wish we had. There are
inherent limitations in the data collection process that
make data problematic for many reasons but gathering a
wide snapshot of interactions is clearly preferable to ob-
serving a single interaction and extrapolating from that
data point. That is not data analysis but an exercise in
guesswork that has no place in the academic or pol-
icy enterprise.
5. Other Data-Focused Efforts in Cyber Security so Far
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) now has an
incident reporting feature (DHS, 2018a) and ongoing ef-
forts to collect data (DHS, 2018b). Without this step, we
are operating in known environment needlessly wearing
a blindfold. Hopefully this will allow the US to become an
open and transparent leader for cyber security data, but
this also leaves out the rest of the world in terms of sam-
pling, making it a problem to generate a global sample
enabled by the targets.
The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strat-
egy proposes data driven solutions to the problem but
these efforts are typically clouded by a disagreement on
methods and evaluation standards rather that starting
first with active threat information collection (UK Gov-
ernment, 2016). The US Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence (ODNI) office offers a standard of eval-
uation hoping to generate what they deem as a “Cyber
Esperanto” method of data evaluation and coding but
fails to articulate a standard by which incidents would be
collected (Ackerman, 2017). Generally, the focus on eval-
uating the phases of attacks rather than starting with a
macro sweep of the field.
It is strange that the cyber security domain has re-
stricted itself from understanding the basic contours of
the conflict dynamics through the analysis of empirical
events. To not take this step is a self-defeating strategy
that betrays our standard operating procedures in other
military and political domains. The first step is to always
understand the behavior of the key threat actors in a do-
main, however in the cyber security field we seem to
think that the adversary is inherently unknowable and
without a past, this is an unhelpful conjecture. The first
step always seems to develop riskmanagementmethods
to minimize damage without seeking to understand the
goals and past actions of the attacker in the first place.
In academia, Healey and Grindal (2013) make clear
strides early on to seek to revive the idea of a disciplinary
history of cyber conflict and examine as many cases as
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possible. Another excellent example is Lindsay’s (2015)
listing of prominent Chinese cyber espionage cases. The
problem is that these examples of macro-case studies
are few and far between. With the exception of Karat-
zogianni (2012) and Middleton (2017), most studies fo-
cus on a few prominent cases like Stuxnet, Shamoon, and
Sony, at the expense of the typical behavior and strate-
gies that rival countries exhibit in cyberspace.
The plethora of new emerging data sources of in-
formation is heartening, but also reinforces key points
we make in Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities (Valeri-
ano & Maness, 2015). We have observed restraint in cy-
ber interactions. Escalation is rare (Valeriano, Jensen, &
Maness, 2018), and most disputes piggyback on previ-
ously known foreign policy conflicts and crises that are
well established, often connected to territorial disputes.
Schneider (2017) demonstrates that even in the context
of wargame scenarios, escalation is rare.
Examining the data on cyber incidents, Pytlak and
Mitchell (2016) are able to point out that rivalry inten-
sity does not predictwhich rivalswill engage in cyber con-
flict. Instead the best predictor is the presence of nuclear
weapons. While the possibility of escalation in the con-
text of nuclear weapons is troubling, we also know that
empirically, nuclear states can push their negotiations to
the edge of war and draw back (Beardsley & Asal, 2009).
Mauslein (2014) also demonstrates empirically that ri-
val states are less likely to engage in cyber conflict due
to escalation risks which counters the early idea that ri-
val states would be primary testing ground for cyber dis-
putes (Valeriano & Maness, 2012).
Understanding the impact of cyber confrontations
appears to be the next key challenge. In an examina-
tion of 1,841 cyber events from 2013 to 2016 in Ukraine,
Kostyuk and Zhukov (2017) demonstrate that cyber ac-
tions had no discernible impact on battlefield events.
Narrowing downon fighting between2014 and2015, the
authors find no escalatory patterns in the cyber data, but
conventional attacks do result in corresponding reprisals.
While this study represents a small selection of battle-
field events in Ukraine, there does appear to be a pat-
tern emerging. Evidence from a case study on Syria finds
many of the same patterns as in the Ukraine case. Va-
leriano et al. (2018) produce a macro level view of the
impact of cyber strategies suggesting that only 5% of the
192 incidents coded produce a describe change in behav-
ior in the target. What is more important is that these
events demonstrate no clear escalatory pattern. Cyber
strategies, even intensely invasive ones that seek to de-
grade networks and systems, neither appear to compel
the adversary nor do they produce the escalation risks of-
ten hypothesized by scholars such as Buchanan (2016).
The Axelrod and Iliev (2014) formal model is another
useful examination of the utility of cyber conflict. They
note that actors with a high degree of stealth have a
lower likelihood of utilizing a cyber weapon because the
utility of the weapon does not decline through time (it is
unlikely to be discovered). They also note that gain is a
key consideration, a state will only use a cyber weapon
if there is a gain to be made. The studies by Valeriano
et al. (2018) and Kostyuk and Zhukov (2017) suggest that
gains are rare therefore the Axelrod and Iliev (2014) for-
mal model would predict a low instance of cyber conflict
when the consideration of effects and gains are added.
A novel investigation produced by Lawson and Mid-
dleton (2016) might be a useful example for future schol-
ars looking to collect data on threat perceptions and se-
curitization policies. By examining the threat construc-
tion of the term “Cyber Pearl Harbor”, the authors are
able to delineate the history of the term’s use and the
key referent objects. They find that 45% of the time,
the term is used to describe threats to civilian infrastruc-
ture. The authors also demonstrate that the term is only
used to discuss actual events 33% of the time with ma-
jority of frames being used to discuss imagined or non-
actual threats.
6. Expanding Cyber Security Data
Our teamhas been coding cyber incident data since 2010
and serves as a unique example of how the process of
collecting cyber security data and evidence can be done.
Our first peer reviewed publishedwork appeared in 2014
in Journal of Peace Research (Valeriano &Maness, 2014).
In this article we note that cyber conflict is muchmore re-
strained than generally understood by popular discourse.
Threat inflation is ripe in cyber security, and the real
use of cyber tools seems to be to enhance the power of
strong states.
The data that Valeriano and Maness (2014, 2015)
have built challenges the cyber revolution perspective
and does so with the tools of social science, and is a nec-
essary turn given the general tone of the debate. We
first determine that a viable data collection method in
light of limited resources was to focus on states that are
committed interstate rivals (Diehl & Goertz, 2001). This
allows us to focus on those actors with an intense history
of recent hostilities that should be the most likely users
of cyber technology on the battlefield (Maness & Valeri-
ano, 2018).
In our research (Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Maness,
Valeriano, & Jensen, 2017; Valeriano & Maness, 2014,
2015), we have been able to marshal a massive amount
of evidence that is useful in dissecting the actual trends
on the cyber battlefield in a geopolitical context. We
demonstrate that while cyber-attacks are increasing in
frequency, they are limited in severity, are directly
connected to traditional territorial disagreements, and
mostly take the shape of espionage and low-level disrup-
tive campaigns rather than outright warfare.
Given this data-based perspective, we question the
dynamics of the cyber security debate and offer a coun-
tering theory where states are restrained from using
moremalicious cyber actions due to the limited nature of
the weapons, the possibly of blowback, the connection
between the digital world and civilian infrastructure, and
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 49–60 53
the reality that any cyber weapon launched can be repli-
cated and used right back against the attacker. Given all
of these perspectives gleamed from the data, we must
moderate our views about the transformation that is of-
fered by cyber strategists who stress amore revolutionist
tone (Lango, 2016).
Social science clearly matters for contemporary
technological policy debates. Absent rigorous methods,
much of what is in the field is basically guesswork. Our
work really owes an intellectual debt to J. David Singer,
who started the effort to quantify war at the University
of Michigan with the Correlates of War (COW) project
(Small & Singer, 1982). Our project builds on thismethod-
ology and uses many of the same coding strategies. We
recognize that data is awork in progress and seek to build
more andmore knowledge through subsequent updates.
By gathering the full picture, we can gain the perspective
that really matters in these emerging policy debates re-
garding the cyber battlefield.
The problem with collecting data where it does not
exist already are centered around the difficulties that
come with starting such an endeavor in the first place.
Often it has been claimed that it would be impossible to
collect cyber conflict data, as such data would present
a skewed picture of the scope of the field. Yet the imag-
ined impossibility of collecting data should never be the
barrier in starting such an undertaking, and the only real
barrier should be the literal impossibility of collecting
such information.
In the process of collecting data on these state-based
cyber events, we found that official leaks to the media
have been helpful, but more importantly for the cyber
security field was the obvious impetus by cyber security
firms to demonstrate their ability to identify attacks and
release reports forensically accounting for the process
behind the attacks. This sort of information was exactly
what we were looking for and it continues to be avail-
able to this day as the ultimate calling card demonstrat-
ing skills and expertise, but also as a source of informa-
tion in our investigation. We are prudent and recognize
that there have been other efforts at empirically-focused
cyber security research.Wewelcome all and every effort
since it will allow for the field to seek the overall goal
for the accumulation of knowledge around cyber secu-
rity practices.
Subsequent work in our book Cyber War Versus Cy-
ber Realities reinforced these points and added case stud-
ies to support our empirical findings. Our next book, Cy-
ber Strategy, includes cyber incident data from 2000 to
2014 between rival states. Our cut point is 2014 because
the majority of the coding effort was done in 2016 and
we are firm in belief that while cyber incidents can be
coded, one needs to wait at least a year to make sure
the sources, actors, and targets are confidently known.
The main addition in our work is a consideration of
the efficacy of cyber actions. Simply, do they work? To
that end we have now coded concessions and targets
in the data. We also altered the severity coding to ac-
count for a wider scale of events. All cyber incidents in
the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID) are dyadic
and the countries must be considered rivals, which are
states with recent past animosities with each other. For
the coding of the variables for all pairs of states added
to the dataset (non-state actors or entities can be tar-
gets but not initiators as long as they critical to state-
based systems, or if the original hack escalates into an
international incident in the non-cyber domain), the ini-
tiation must come from a government or there must
be evidence that an incident or dispute was govern-
ment sanctioned.
For the target state, the objectmust be a government
entity, either military or non-military; or a private en-
tity that is part of the target state’s national security ap-
paratus (power grids, defense contractors, and security
companies), an important media organization (fourth es-
tate), or a critical corporation. Third parties are noted
and coded as an additional variable in the data.
We are also now including information on cyber
strategies, breaking this down into a four-point typology
that is mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive.
1. Disruptions: which include taking down websites,
disrupting online activities, and are usually low cost, low
pain incidents such as vandalism or DDoS techniques;
2. Short-Term Espionage: gains access that enables
a state to leverage critical information for an immedi-
ate advantage example; an example being the Russian
theft of DNC emails and publicly releasing them in a
disinformation campaign during the 2016 US presiden-
tial election;
3. Long-Term Espionage: seeks to manipulate the
decision-calculus of the opposition far into the fu-
ture through leveraging information gathered during
cyber operations to enhance credibility and capability,
an example being China’s theft of Lockheed Martin’s
F-35 plans;
4. Degrade: attempt physical degradation of a tar-
gets’ capabilities. Example: US’ Stuxnet against Iran;
create chaos in a country to invoke a foreign pol-
icy response.
The most active dyad in the international system
is China and the US. The majority of these incidents
between the world’s two most powerful states are
espionage campaigns. China sees itself as the rising
power that is far behind its status quo counterpart, and
this could explain the disproportional balance in initi-
ations between the two states (Lindsay, 2015). Most
US-initiated attacks against China are counterespionage
degradation campaigns to raise the costs of future es-
pionage by China so that they slow or stop these mali-
cious attacks on American intellectual property and gov-
ernment information. US–China cyber relations came to
a head as a result of the OPM hack discovery in 2015,
where China successfully stole the personal and sensi-
tive information of over 20 million federal employees
and contractors. This led to a high-level meeting be-
tween Obama and Chinese President Xi Jingping dur-
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ing the latter’s state visit in September 2015, where the
two agreed to halt intellectual property theft from each
other. It has been reported that China has drastically
reduced its cyber espionage on the US as a result of
this agreement, which was a diplomatic victory for the
Obama Administration where escalation and arms races
have been avoided (FireEye, 2017). It remains to be seen
whether this behavior will hold with the new Trump Ad-
ministration, whose early rhetoric with Beijing has been
more bombastic.
The more recent cyber menace for the US has been
Russia, where the former Cold War foe has successfully
socially engineered attacks on political networks, includ-
ing the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),
as well as Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign man-
ager John Podesta’s email account. The information
stolen from these accounts was then strategically re-
leased to WikiLeaks (ODNI, 2017), which could have
changed enough minds in crucial swing states and pos-
sibly was the deciding factor in the victory of Donald
Trump in the 2016 US presidential election. The Obama
Administration has responded with economic sanctions
on high-level Kremlin operatives and has expelled a few
dozen diplomats from the US. However, it remains to be
seen if the Trump Administration will continue to hold
the Russians to account for these acts of espionage and
information warfare.
Yet these data breaches could have been easily pre-
vented with basic cyber hygiene practices for those with
access to the networks, and the political espionage con-
ducted by Russia is not outside the acceptable behav-
iors for spy agencies. The blame could easily lie with the
Democratic Party for being so vulnerable to outside at-
tack. Before promoting offensive posturing and escala-
tory retaliatory action, the US needs to get its networks
better defended society-wide, and cyber hygiene policies
to prevent such easy attacks such as the Russian election
hacks would be a good first start. If the US is considering
going toe to toe with its cyber adversaries, the defenses
of its large attack surface and vulnerable networks need
to be shored up significantly.
Dyads not involving the US are overwhelmingly re-
gional rivals, suggesting that adversarial relationships be-
tween these states have beenongoing for years (Vasquez,
1993). Rivals who have been managing these relation-
ships for a long time have developed normal relations
(Azar, 1972) and given that most of these cyber inci-
dents and disputes launched against each other are dis-
ruptions or espionage, the probability that cyber conflict
between regional rivals will lead to escalatory tensions
remains low.
Breaking down the macro evidence of Valeriano et
al. (2018), Table 1 below shows that 87% of all cyber inci-
dents between rival states are either disruptions or espi-
onage. Victims of these acts of cyber malice have not re-
sponded in an escalatory fashion in the majority of cases
(Maness et al., 2017), indicating that responses have ei-
ther been proportional via conventional foreign policy
tactics, such as targeted economic sanctions, or diplo-
matic outreach to promote better behavioral patterns
have been successful. Evidence for policies of restraint
as the future of governance of the international cyber
realm are demonstrated, strengthening these modes of
behavior for all states in the international system, as
championed by the UN’s Group of Government Experts
(GGE), should be the primary goals of the government of
the US and its NATO and EU allies.
Table 1. Cyber incidents by coercive objective.
Coercive Objective Number (%)
Disruption 70 (36%)
Espionage 97 (51%)
Degradation 25 (13%)
Total 192 (100%)
US deterrence proponents such as former Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper have posited that
cyber-attacks will get worse “until such times as we cre-
ate both the substance and psychology of deterrence”
(Jones, 2015). This is assuming that cyber incidents will
not only grow in number but also in severity, where es-
calation will be the future if deterrence mechanisms can-
not be put into place. This would require developing so-
phisticated cyber weapons, communicating these capa-
bilities to potential adversaries in the cyber realm, and
beingwilling to follow throughwith action thatmayharm
civilians, lead to escalatory retaliation, and provide ene-
mies with digital technologies they did not have before
the attack. Yet this type of thinking is an enduring one as
more high-profile data breaches, usually espionage cam-
paigns or disruptive information operations and rarely
physical degradations (Valeriano et al., 2018) continue
to proliferate and be misconstrued in popular narratives
(Lawson, 2013).
According to the data, offensive posturing and digi-
tal arms races that the US may set into motion as pol-
icy could be self-defeating policies (Craig & Valeriano,
2016). There are normative modes of behavior from
states that have been observable since the turn of the
century based on collected empirical data that suggest
that cyberspace can be governed from a less escalatory
strategy, where restraint mechanisms can be built upon
if the US and its transatlantic allies continue to push for
stabilizing norms. The question that remains at the time
of this writing is whether or not the Trump Administra-
tion will continue this process or turn toward the more
dangerous deterrent strategy.
Scholars who have looked at past dynamics of cyber
conflicts find that there is evidence for restraint from
states. Reveron (2012) acknowledges that states have
great capabilities in terms of inflicting damage on one
another, yet this does not mean that they will. Espionage
and disruptions seem to be the majority of state-based
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actions, andmore coercive degrading techniques such as
Stuxnet or Shamoon are exceptions to the rule according
to Valeriano et al. (2018). The need for weaponized retal-
iatory responses and initiating policies that promote this
behavior may therefore be premature at this point, ac-
cording to available evidence.
The key point is the evidence is critical to evaluate the
domain. How can policy decisions be made without con-
sidering the shape and scope of the environment? Some
scholars paint a vastly different picture than those in the
discourse and this is spurred on by a careful analysis of
empirical evidence.
7. Important Components of any Dataset
Many groups have produced lists of cyber events, the
most prominent might be Hackmageddon (2018). The
key aspect to understand is that making a list of cyber
events is not enough to produce social science inferences
or data analyses. So much more is required. The Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations (CFR) cyber operations tracker
covers cyber incidents from the years 2005–2017 (CFR,
2018). It includes incidents that are “suspected” to have
state sponsorship plus non-state action. This is a prob-
lem for datasets of this kind, as laying blame on a state or
group for cyber actions has enormous geopolitical impli-
cations. Throwing suspected state-sponsored incidents
in with verifiable ones is problematic coding and raises
the possibility of retractions at a later date.
For the variable coded as affiliation, which attempts
to attribute the group responsible for the cyber inci-
dent, 105 cells of this variable are left blank. Further-
more, 37 of these cells either begin with the phrases “be-
lieved to be” or “possibly”, indicating further uncertainty
of who just might be responsible for the cyber incident.
This translates to the coders having 74% of their coded
incidents being uncertain that the culprit had been a
state actor.
In theDCID,wewait at least one calendar year to pass
before we begin to code a year. Right now, our latest, ver-
sion, 1.1 covers all dyadic cyber incidents between rival
states from 2000–2014. We are in the process of coding
version 1.5, which will include state-initiated incidents
from the years 2000–2016. Both collect government ini-
tiated cyber action between rival states from the years
2000–2014, which are extracted from the Klein, Goertz
and Diehl (2006) dataset on enduring rivals as well as
Thompson’s (2001) strategic rivalry dataset. Coding ef-
forts are mirrored after the COW project that records
conventional conflict dynamics since the Napoleonic
Wars (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996). Several variables
are coded based on typologies, methods, target types,
coercive objectives, and severity levels. Events are coded
into cyber incidents and disputes. Incidents are individ-
ual events that can last a matter of hours, days, or weeks,
depending on method and have specific objectives. The
Stuxnet worm is classified as a cyber incident. Disputes
are larger campaigns that can contain multiple incidents
and are part of a larger strategy. The Olympic Games dis-
putewhich contains Stuxnet but also espionage incidents
such as Duqu and Flame.
Many cyber incidents can take months to find the
proper attribution, especially covert espionage incidents.
The analogy of the iceberg is often made with the idea
that much what we know about cyber interactions falls
below the surface. Instead we argue that at some point,
the iceberg flips over andwe are able to get a representa-
tive sample of the dynamics of all cyber actions. What is
unknown is important, but it is also unknowable. For an
incident tomake it in the DCID, wemust have at least two
verifiable sources that have given enough confidence to
place the blame on a state actor. Sources include gov-
ernment intelligence reports and cyber security foren-
sic reports.
We must be clear that datasets need some things in
common to make them useable to the wider community.
Every effort to produce a trusted source of cyber security
information should contain clear coding rules, indepen-
dent variables, compatibility with other coding efforts,
and reliability checks. Clear coding rules are critical for
any social science effort. How does an outside observer
knowwhat is coded in the dataset?What is included and
what is left out? This is associated with the condition of
replication. Can someone come behind your effort and
produce something similar? Clear instructions are critical
in order to ensure the progression of knowledge, build-
ing and reproducing prior work is critical in seek to con-
firm knowledge.
A dataset cannot simply be a list of events, that is
just a list. Independent variables are critical for any data
source. This should include location information, charac-
teristics of the unit of observation, issues such as link-
ages to other events, damage and severity, and a host of
other factors that make up what might be a traditional
dataset that can be used for analysis. If there is just a list
of events, this is just a single variable that would then
need to be merged into another source.
The next clear requirement is the compatibility with
prior efforts. The whole purpose of data collection ef-
forts being clear and replicable is to ensure that knowl-
edge is moving forward based on some sort of basic
consensus. Others should be able to build on your work
and push things forward. The data should be compatible
with other sources, our cyber events coded in the DCID
dataset has country codes, dates, and other events that
can be linked and merged to other data efforts. This ef-
fort is based on the Correlates ofWar project (Jones et al.,
1996), a long-standing data collection effort and can be
fit in with other data research done in the International
Relations field. Avoiding trying to reinvent the wheel and
respecting the efforts of those that have come before is
critical in moving forward towards shared wisdom.
Finally, reliability is likely the most critical aspect of
any dataset. Is it reliable in that we are sure that it was
coded correctly, absent of as much bias as possible, and
others should be able to take the coding rules and agree
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with the basic judgements made? Our DCID data was in-
dependently checked by three other hired coders at both
rounds of data coding. Version 1.1 of the DCID also had
a group of 15 military officers go through all the coding
of the more subjective elements to ensure that our cod-
ing of success, impact, and actors was reliable and could
withstand basic measures of intercoder reliability and ac-
ceptance of judgement calls made on borderline cases.
Salehyan (2015) has a useful review of the things
needed to produce data in the conflict studies field.
There are a host of other issues we have not even begun
tomention such as source bias, source inclusion, scalabil-
ity, information extraction, and the challenges of analy-
sis. One such challenge rarely admitted in cyber security
is the problem of selection effects (Fearon, 2002). If we
are only taking a sample, such as state-based actions re-
ported by the press, or in our case, only actions between
rivals, we are only coding a selection of the wider possi-
ble universe of cases. This constraint is critical in under-
standing the implications of the possible analysis done
on the data. Selecting which cyber incidents to be ex-
amined, whether state-based, cybercrime, or cyber ac-
tivism, is a critical judgement call that one must make
to facilitate analysis, and the coders must be clear about
these choices and their implications.
8. Data Investigations of the Future, What Comes
Next?
Social science investigations into cyber security interac-
tions are rare to this point. There is much that needs to
be done before we can suggest that the field has a strong
grasp of cyber security interactions. Instead, speculation
substitutes for detailed understanding and this is of lim-
ited value given the importance of cyber security chal-
lenges. Rigorous surveys of cyber security interactions
are rare. While it seems clear that the public and elites
regards cyber threats as prime challenges to the security
of the state (Stares, 2017), it is unclear just what context
is given to the respondents and what background they
are operating under when making sweeping judgements
about the security challenges states face.
Embedding experiments within surveys is a potential
avenue for future research. Kreps and Schneider (2017)
demonstrate that public respondents are unlikely to ad-
vocate for escalation even under hypothetical situations.
Experiments into human behavior in response to cyber
security threats is also critical. Utilizing biological sam-
ples of stress, a series of studies seem to suggest that
the population regards cyber security threats on parwith
conventional terror threats (Gross, Canetti, & Vashdi,
2016). Cyber security challenges result in elevated stress
levels (Gross et al., 2017). What is unclear is if this is an
outlier tied to the sample country, Israel, and what con-
ditions might bring down elevated threat frameworks.
Repression is another key area to study in the future.
The expectation is that the future of cyber combatwill be
state on state violence when in reality we observe much
more state on individual cyber violence than would be
expected (Valeriano, 2016). The challenge is collecting
data on cyber repressive events which are akin to human
rights violations. Some have made strides examining in-
dividual state repressive incidents (Gohdes, 2015), while
others have demonstrated that states experiencing DDoS
attacks are also likely the victims of internal repression
(Asal et al., 2016).
Future datasets will need to expand to investigate
non-state actors and internally repressive cyber incidents.
We believe this is the critical future of cyber security in-
vestigations. Investigating the macro data inherent in cy-
ber processes can help us understand much more about
the domain than the conjecture that seems to dominate
the field. All these efforts are awork in progress butwork-
ing in conjunction with other scholars and avoiding dupli-
cation is the only way to move forward.
9. Conclusion
Establishing knowledge about the cyber security domain
is critical because it is recognized as a Tier 1 secu-
rity threat. The potential implications of a cyber secu-
rity disasters and the strategic logic behind the cyber
threatsmakes the utilization of cyberweapons a possible
method of interstate competition. The challenge is to un-
derstand howmuch of this perspective is based on threat
inflation and how realistic any of these conjectures is in
relation to reality.
By undertaking data exploration efforts, we can seek
progress forward on critical security questions. There is
appears to be a consensus in the field that there is evi-
dent restraint in cyberspace despite the potential for con-
flict. This consensus is supported by the Council of For-
eign Relations incident data which locates only 191 in-
cidents from 2005–2017. The DCID data, which is re-
stricted to only rival states, locates 192 incidents from
2000–2014 (Maness et al., 2017). Other supporting inves-
tigations find similar limited engagements utilizing cyber
methods to alter state to state relationships.
States are the most cyber-capable actors in the inter-
national system (Nye, 2011), therefore collecting data on
cyber actions enacted by state actors has been our start-
ing point. The next step in our research program is to
begin collection of data on non-state actors, which is a
much larger universe of cases, but not impossible to col-
lect data and infer implications of the dynamics of cyber-
crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber hackitivism. Our same
methods and procedures, we posit, will uncover these
unknowns in the social science realm of cyber conflict
and security research.
This is not to say that data is the only way forward in
cyber security. Rigorous case study logic that establishes
critical casual actions is welcome. Examining wargames
and responses in combat scenarios is also important. For-
mal modeling would be useful in deducing behavioral op-
tions and the constraints imposed by institutions. The cy-
ber security field is ripe for more social science-based in-
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vestigations, but these must include the direct collabo-
ration of social scientists who have experience in coding
data, practitioners who experience the events first hand,
and policy-makers who seek to transform the data into
actionable events.
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